Monday, May 25, 2015

Alternatives to Neoliberalism


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Socialist Project • E-Bulletin No. 1122
May 25, 2015
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Polarizing Development:

Introducing Alternatives to Neoliberalism and the Crisis

Taken from Polarizing Development: Alternatives to Neoliberalism and the Crisis (2015), edited by Lucia Pradella and Thomas Marois, Pluto Press. Available online atwww.plutobooks.com. We thank Pluto Press for permission to reproduce this excerpt.

Thomas Marois and Lucia Pradella

Neoliberal economic policies, with their emphasis on market-led development and individual rationality, have been exposed as bankrupt not only by the global economic crisis but also by increasing social opposition and resistance. Social movements and critical scholars in Latin America, East Asia, Europe and the United States, alongside the Arab uprisings, have triggered renewed debate on possible different futures. While for some years any discussion of substantive alternatives has been marginalized, the global crisis since 2008 has opened up new spaces to debate, and indeed to radically rethink, the meaning of development. Debates on developmental change are no longer tethered to the pole of ‘reform and reproduce’: a new pole of ‘critique and strategy beyond’ neoliberal capitalism has emerged.
Despite being forcefully challenged, neoliberalism has proven remarkably resilient. In the first years since the crisis erupted, the bulk of the alternative literature pointed to continued growth in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and in other big emerging market countries to affirm the necessary role for the state in sustaining capitalist development. New developmental economists have consequently reasserted themselves. Their proposals converged into a broader demand for global Keynesianism (Patomäki, 2012) – a demand that is proving to be less and less realistic in the face of a deepening global economic crisis.

Polarizing the Debate on Alternatives

Advocates of ‘reform and reproduce’ – be they new developmental or neo-Keynesian – share deep commitments to capitalism and the subordination of workers to the needs of accumulation. In contrast, neoliberalism and the ongoing crisis are an expression of the fundamental contradictions of capitalism. Alternatives depend upon the workers, women, peasants and oppressed peoples that have struggled to create and defend them. In the analysis of capitalism and the current crisis, it is necessary to overcome academic divisions between development studies of the South and the study of neoliberalism in the North.
Importantly, nation-states cannot be seen as self-contained units of analysis: that is, the ‘methodological nationalism’ found in much of the developmental literature. The specific national instances of neoliberalism are also influenced by the global tendencies of capitalist accumulation as an integrated whole. In this approach, contemporary development is not separated from existing labour and social movements, just as concrete alternatives depend on real social mobilizations. Capitalist development is taken as an inherently antagonistic and polarizing process shaped by class struggle. Alternatives are assessed by the extent to which they enable the fulfilment of social aspirations for an equal and just existence free from exploitation and oppression. They reveal the contours of different and better possible forms of social development; the nature and varieties of neoliberalism; and the forms alternatives must take.

Interpreting Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is a historical phenomenon. In the early 1970s firms began acutely to feel the impact of falling profitability. Many managers and owners believed the mounting power of organized labour was responsible. Indeed, this emerging structural crisis of capitalism was amplified by increasing labour militancy and social opposition, and by the rising challenge of socialism and nationalism from the Global South – the greatest wave of decolonization in world history (Arrighi, 2008: 136). The power of the United States reached its nadir with its defeat in Vietnam (1975), with the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s, and with the spread of revolutionary struggles, notably in Latin America. It is against this backdrop that the rise of neoliberalism becomes understandable.
Neoliberalism's set of pro-market and anti-labour policies were first implemented by the brutal U.S.-backed Pinochet dictatorship in Chile (1973). The monetarist economic principles of the infamous ‘Chicago Boys’ guided the process. At this time, however, many other governments in the South resisted initial demands by the Northern-dominated international financial institutions (IFIs), notably the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), to implement rapid ‘shock therapy’ structural adjustment programmes.
The 1979 to 1982 Volcker Shock changed matters dramatically. Paul Volcker, then head of the U.S. Federal Reserve, allowed U.S. interest rates to skyrocket from around 5 per cent to over 20 per cent, ostensibly to halt persistent inflation and to shock the U.S. economy out of stagnation. This move sparked a global rise in interest rates and a wave of profound economic crises in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Soviet bloc. Governments in these countries lost the ability to service their debts because of the dramatic falls in the prices received for and the quantity of their primary goods exported. This triggered the 1980s debt crisis, which opened an opportunity for governments North and South to press more systematically for neoliberal transformation.
Instead of mobilizing workers and peasants against this new form of economic imperialism, governments in the South began to reorient their economies toward intensified export production in order to earn the foreign currency needed to repay their loans. With the fall of the Soviet Union, neoliberal shock therapy was also extended to Russia and other Eastern European countries. In the former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan, Western governments mobilized their military power to facilitate the entrenchment of neoliberal policies at a terrible human cost.

Washington Consensus: Ten Characteristic Policies

Neoliberalism has entailed processes of contested socio-economic transformation. Amidst great popular resistance and economic instability, post-war state-led strategies of development gave way to market-oriented neoliberal ones, or the so-called ‘Washington consensus’. The economist John Williamson identified ten policies characteristic of the consensus: fiscal discipline, reduction in public expenditure, tax reform, financial liberalization, market-determined exchange rates, trade liberalization, an open door to foreign direct investment, privatization of public service and state-owned enterprises, deregulation, and secure property rights. These policies have led to higher unemployment, worsening social inequalities, widespread impoverishment, peasant land dispossessions, unsustainable urbanization and increased worker exploitation.
Contributors to the book describe many of the specific developmental transformations in the Global South, and how neoliberal processes have led to an expansion of the global reserve army of workers and accelerated international migration. At the same time, financial and trade deregulation have enhanced the power of finance capital and multinational corporations, which they have used to pursue the outsourcing and offshoring of many industrial and service activities. This globalization of production has brought with it intensified processes of ecological destruction.
Women and the poor are the most negatively impacted by the neoliberal privatization of public services. As women increasingly enter into the workforce, the privatization of public services magnifies their ‘double burden’. Such transformations have been global, having negative impacts on workers in the South and increasingly in the North.
The neoliberal policies shaping these transformative processes are derived from neoclassical economic theory. Neoclassical theory obscures and naturalises the exploitative foundations of capitalism because it reduces labour to just another factor of production, not unlike other ‘technical inputs’ like land and capital. The social reproduction of workers is further assumed to be a private, genderless process restricted to the household, when it is in fact vital to overall capital accumulation processes. In not dissimilar ways, neoclassical economics tends to treat the environment as an externality. Further embedded in this kind of approach is a tendency toward methodological nationalism. Certain models presuppose that capital and labour do not move internationally and that international trade represents merely exchange of commodities between national units. It follows, in theory, that by promoting domestic specialization according to a given country's comparative advantage, free trade would spontaneously stabilize participating ‘national’ economies at an equilibrium level, maintaining employment and growth in all of them.
With its emphasis on liberal, market-based notions of individual equality and freedom, neoclassical economics conceals underlying social polarizations and exploitative relationships characteristic of capitalism. In reality, neoliberal transformation favours the interests of the strongest capitals internationally (see Shaikh, 2005). Despite the proclaimed spontaneity of the market, neoliberalism does not lead to a retreat of the state. Rather, neoliberalism is marked by the class-based restructuring of the state apparatus in ways that have responded to the evolving needs of capital accumulation (for example, around new financial imperatives). What is more, as today's capitalism is dominated by Northern powerhouses like the United States and Western European countries, the extension of capitalist relations also globally embodies these imperialist powers’ aspirations to retain supremacy in the hierarchy of states.
Neoliberalism, in fact, has always occurred through and within states, never in the absence of states. Actually existing neoliberal transformations are mediated by the hierarchical position of a given state within the world market and by specific social struggles. Consequently, neoliberal transition in the United States is not the same as neoliberalism transition in India or Iraq, and each entails specific national, class, racial and gendered dimensions. Yet contributors to this book recognize that neoliberalism is a class-based political and economic project, defined by the attack of capital and neoliberal state authorities on the collective capacity of organized labour, the peasantry and popular classes to resist the subordination of all social, political, economic and ecological processes to accumulation imperatives. The subsequent consolidation of neoliberalism globally has thus been to the benefit of global capital, and has come at the expense of workers, women and the poor. Relations of imperialist domination, environmental exploitation, racial and gender oppression are constitutive dimensions of this class struggle.

Resisting Neoliberalism

Neoliberal consolidations nonetheless generate new social resistances. Many contributors identify continuing processes involving the recomposition of working classes and the formation of important social movements. With the 1999 demonstrations in Seattle, these struggles assumed an inter-American character. Various indigenous groups, trade unionists, faith-based and women's organizations marched alongside environmentalists and farmers in a collective bid to shut down the World Trade Organization (WTO) talks (Burbach, Fox and Fuentes, 2013: 2). In the new millennium, the ‘alter-globalization’ movement has attained a truly global scale. Yet the movement has not been without problems. Notably, the activists and organizations have failed to produce precise sets of collective demands or a coherent international political programme. Pre-existing antagonisms among workers and peoples across lines of national and social oppression were not overcome. The movement, as a result, failed to articulate collective resistance across national, regional and international levels (Prashad, 2013: 235). After the huge demonstrations against the war on Iraq (2003), it gradually faded away.
Still, resistances to neoliberalism grew thereafter, especially in the Global South. In some cases these made significant advances. For example, while the United States and other Western states were bogged down with military aggressions in the Middle East, U.S. control over Latin America eased. Social mobilizations there enjoyed new spaces for action, which helped give rise to a variety of progressive governments less subservient to imperialist interests and the competitive imperatives of neoliberal development.
Neoliberal transformations also create new socio-economic conditions that may undermine U.S. and Western hegemony. As several authors attest, for example, the relocation of industrial production toward East Asia has generated new centres of accumulation. Consequently, Western imperial powers now face a major challenge with the rise of China and India. So too have other big emerging capitalisms, like Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Indonesia and the Gulf States, become ever more important centres of accumulation. This has lent support to arguments suggesting global hegemony has started to shift from the West to the East.
To be sure, these emerging capitalisms, China in particular, offer alternative sources of foreign direct investment, international aid, developmental loans and technological know-how to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Leaders of the BRICS have, for example, called for a ‘multipolar’ reform of the financial system and of the IFIs, which includes the establishment of a new multilateral Development Bank, the ‘BRICS Bank’. Yet the extent to which these changes offer an alternative at all has everything to do with the extent to which South–South relations and flows of know-how do not serve to extend and reproduce exploitative class relations of domination, even be they under novel forms of sub/southern imperialism. This remains to be seen, and indeed the global crisis is affecting the terms of this debate.

The Global Crisis and the Resilience of Neoliberalism

The global crisis that emerged in the United States in 2007 was rooted in the preceding decades of neoliberal restructuring. Its immediate trigger, however, was the subprime mortgage lending debacle. The U.S. subprime crisis then took a global turn in late September 2008 with the collapse of the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers. As investors scrambled to preserve their wealth and dump any toxic assets they had bought into, otherwise liquid U.S. credit markets seized up, bringing the global financial system to the edge of ruin. Only massive and sustained state intervention prevented the system's implosion. Many Western governments rolled out financial Keynesianism. This entailed nationalizing failed private banks and industries and adding trillions of dollars to the public debt. The governments thus staved off global economic collapse but only by incurring massive increases in new public debts. This gave rise to the sovereign debt crises in the ‘peripheral’ EU countries. A number of developing countries also incurred new public debts as governments rolled out economic stimulus packages to help sustain domestic investment, maintain employment and buttress internal demand.
On the one hand, the privileges and powers gained by global capital under neoliberal transformation remain largely intact. Indeed, imperialist governments have done everything in their power to reinforce the current system. Such is the aim of the quantitative easing and zero interest rate policies being pursued by the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Banks of England and Japan, and increasingly the European Central Bank. These actions are intended to prop up the financial markets, support the prices of financial assets and make these countries’ exports more competitive. Throughout it all neoliberal technocrats remain unwavering in their ideological commitments to market-oriented development. For example, the World Bank's Global Financial Development Report 2013 attempts to reframe the global crisis not as a fundamental problem of ‘market failure’ and capitalism, but instead as essentially about ‘state failure’ and flawed human nature. The solution? More of the same neoliberal policies implemented since the 1980s, but now guided and sustained by a more robust state apparatus that ensures better market discipline. Despite such socially costly crisis and recovery processes, neoliberalism remains largely intact and unscathed among the globe's major international policymakers (Marois, 2012: 208–13).
On the other hand, the interests of those workers, peasants and women who did not cause the crisis have been targeted and undermined in efforts to overcome the crisis. By socializing the costs through the state apparatus, governments have forced workers and popular classes to pay for the crisis (Marois, 2014). In Western countries, austerity has reinforced preceding trends toward increased poverty and social inequality, disproportionately impacting workers, especially immigrant workers, and women. This is discursively framed around the need to renew growth. In this narrative, the banker, the bureaucrat and the baker's helper are all in it together. Nothing is further from the truth. The point is that in a context of sluggish profitability, austerity is necessary for capital to increase labour exploitation and profits.
Workers and popular classes may be down, but they are not out. In response to the rank injustice meted out by those in power wishing to preserve capitalism in the wake of the crisis, social resistances have arisen anew. Contributors to this book highlight their spectacular range and diversity, starting from the development of a revolutionary movement in the Arab world. Yet this book's contributors are under no illusion that economic crisis alone will launch the collapse of neoliberalism or capitalism. So long as neoliberal advocates are able to push the costs of crisis systematically onto workers, women and oppressed peoples, capitalists will find means of reproducing this exploitative system. That said, the crisis and the movements emerging in response have reopened an opportunity to envision, and fight for, substantial alternatives.

The Limits of New Developmental Alternatives

The immediate aftermath of the global crisis raised the spectre of global Keynesianism. The long-standing institutionalist thesis necessitating the extra-market role of the state in sustaining capitalist growth and stability seemed vindicated. In the Global South too new developmentalist statist strategies were seemingly vindicated. The rejuvenated developmental state was contributing to an apparent post-crisis global recovery, nowhere more visible than in China with its massive capital infusions.
There is an internal logic to their reassertion of the state. New developmental scholars understand neoliberalism primarily through an institutional lens as various manifestations of the Washington consensus policies. As new developmentalists see it, then, the real problem is that these market-oriented policies have failed to produce stable growth and reduce inequality. Rather, recurrent crises and instability have created boom/bust growth cycles and worsened inequality. It follows that neoliberalism is essentially a ‘policy error’ characterized by excessive regulatory slippage. By implication, a break with neoliberalism can be achieved by a ‘return of the state’ (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012). However, as this debate is only concerned with how to best achieve virtuous cycles of capitalist growth, capitalism itself is never in question. Merely the pace, timing and institutional strength of changes in the regulatory environment of ‘national’ capitalisms are questioned. New developmentalism, advocates argue, would allow a return to an ‘original’ development path devoid of the labour repression, climate change, gender inequality and state bureaucratization characteristic of the first developmentalism (Kahn and Christiansen, 2011: 5; 255–7).
New developmentalists present one pole of the debate over alternatives. Contributors to this book present another, radically opposite pole. From our perspective, and for present purposes, we signal four main limitations to the new developmentalist approach to alternatives.
First, new developmentalists ignore the exploitative nature of capitalist production relations. For example, many stress that national progressive competitiveness strategies should drive up domestic productivity. In this thesis, poverty is reduced to a symptom of interrupted cycles of otherwise virtuous growth. Yet, as both Ben Selwyn and Dae-Oup Chang argue in this book, new developmentalist strategies obscure the systematic repression of workers’ rights, wages and human aspirations through the state apparatus. Focusing more on growth and mitigating economic inequality, most developmentalists set aside capitalism's inherent tendency toward social polarization. Consequently, constitutive issues of social reproduction and of the deepening ecological crisis remain largely on the sidelines.
Second, new developmentalists uphold an idealised understanding of the state. In this paradigm, states are understood as autonomous and elite institutions that can moderate capitalist development for the overall ‘social good’. The underlying historical social relations of class, gender and race constitutive of the state apparatus are typically papered over in this framework, and how change is achieved and consolidated, and who benefits from it, are thus distorted.
Third, new developmentalism also rests on methodologically nationalist assumptions, and reproduces the same state/market and national/international dualisms characteristic of neoclassical economics (see Pradella, 2014). Primacy is given to the ‘extra-market’ coordinating role of the state in instituting national comparative advantages in the world market. If achieved, then free trade can once again positively benefit all participating countries. Concretely, scholars point to the national developmental successes of East Asia, and more recently China, as dehistoricised, decontextualised and discrete developmental models seemingly transferable to all developing countries.
Fourth, it follows that new developmentalists underestimate imperialist relations and capitalism's tendency toward uneven and combined development. Mainstream expectations of global economic convergence are exaggerated since the underlying driving forces of neoliberal globalization, which lead toward persistent economic polarization, are still operating. Development in the South continues to be very uneven and characterized by complex hierarchical patterns of international integration and deindustrialization. Looking to Africa, we point to the ‘new scramble for Africa’ as emerging capitalisms like China are solidifying their place in Africa as new trade and financial partners, thus intensifying international competitive imperatives on the continent. Similar patterns of uneven and combined development in the Middle East, East Asia and Latin America are documented elsewhere in the book.
In the final assessment, new developmentalism admirably targets some of neoliberalism's economic failures, seeks to craft virtuous cycles of stable growth and to alleviate poverty. The structural power of capital and the systematic exploitation of workers are nonetheless repackaged and reproduced. New developmentalism only modifies neoliberalism as a form of class rule responding to labour and social mobilizations. At the same time the post-crisis consolidations of what have been defined as new developmentalist governments have given rise to new social tensions. For example, there is a mounting sense of collective consciousness and power arising within the Chinese working-class. And China is by no means the only case. Over the last several years significant protest waves and movements have erupted in Russia, India, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and Turkey. The crisis is indeed global. Despite much rhetoric, the BRICS countries have not formed a real alliance and they remain dependent on exports to and financial relations with imperialist countries, with their economic growth now decelerating or stopping altogether. There is a great need, therefore, to elaborate on real alternatives to neoliberal capitalism.

What Makes for Substantive Developmental Alternatives?

Contributors to this book share an understanding that many societies are in dire need of substantive alternatives to both neoliberal capitalism and its new developmentalist variants. But what does this mean? While we do not ascribe to a single, shared vision (nor need we), each contributor has tried to identify and signal various progressive tendencies that arise from the specific contexts, cases and struggles they have dealt with – be it from women's struggles in Turkey, Cambodia or Venezuela, from revolutionary lessons in Latin America and the Middle East, or from the many labour resistances discussed. We accepted at the start of the project that alternatives cannot and do not simply arrive pre-formed from outside existing society. In other words, the struggle to break with neoliberal capitalism necessarily begins within the historical confines of neoliberalism. Consequently, alternatives must be sought in everyday and actually existing struggles.
To recognize the necessarily historical specificity of struggles to overcome neoliberal capitalism is not to abandon universal aspirations for social justice or common strategies of resistance. On the contrary, by analysing how capitalism works, contributors to this book have tried to provide an analytical framework within which a strategy of change can be shaped. To this end, we share a baseline understanding of what is needed to constitute an alternative. That is, any alternative must stand in sharp contrast to any form of exploitation and oppression, and it must be achieved through working and popular class agency. There is no evidence that capitalists and their advocates will relinquish their accumulated institutional and material power and control willingly. Progressive change must be achieved from below.
Given this shared baseline, it is worth highlighting some of the concrete strategies and principles that emerge throughout the book.
Worker-led resistances and aspirations: What gains have been made by workers and popular classes are due to their collective mobilizations. Many argue that the sustainability of struggles for progressive alternatives depends on the capacity of labour and social movements to build local, national, regional and international movements oriented toward structural transformation. Many highlight the importance of establishing cooperative productive and economic capacity as a prerequisite for more solidarity-based and worker-led social economies, for example, the regional Zapatista movement in Mexico and national Landless Movement in Brazil, but question the extent to which these forms of peasant resistance are generalizable. Others identify the length of the working day as a key terrain of social transformation, and affirm the centrality of creating autonomous working-class political organizations with an internationalist and anti-imperialist perspective. If the global restructuring of production and international migration potentially strengthens the working-class internationally, we need to reflect on the strategies needed to unify workers across the North/South divide and beyond national and radicalized divisions. Similarly, effective anti-war movements have to be based on a new solidarity of working-class and oppressed peoples’ struggles.
Equitable social reproduction: We highlight the crucial importance of women's agency in challenging the gendered inequalities of neoliberal production and social reproduction, drawing on socialist feminist tenets. These contributions point to the need to fight for renewed public services to alleviate the unequal burdens women face day in and day out. Contributors also highlight the need to radically question allegedly natural gender roles in the domestic sphere. At the same time, the differential exploitation of women workers needs to be addressed, defending women's rights as women and as workers. Various contributors highlight the enormous potential for these struggles, including the crucial role of women in the Arab uprisings and in the struggles sparked by the Rana Plaza disaster in Bangladesh.
Renewing and democratizing the public sector: There is no escaping the struggle to substantively democratize the public sector. To the extent that new developmentalists seek alternatives to neoliberalism, state-owned and public services are presented as alternatives simply because they are not privately owned. Contributors to this book share no such illusions: public services can be aggressively neoliberal in their operations. To recognize this is not to reject the public sector as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for breaking with neoliberalism. Public ownership can provide a powerful stimulus toward more collective social ownership and the democratization of political and economic processes. Yet this is no straightforward process. In the many struggles aiming to protect public service provisioning globally we need to develop a clearer definition of ‘publicness’ and an alternative methodology by which we can critically evaluate and improve public services for the social good. This is essential given, for example, the massive capacity that still-existing state banks hold globally. Capturing and democratizing these public sources of credit, along with the dispossession of the accumulated wealth and power of financial capital, is a necessary feature of any sustainable alternative to neoliberalism. The knock-on benefits of exerting democratic control over society's monetary resources are substantial: solidaristic funding for public services, public infrastructure and cooperatives, as well as for gendered and green social developmental initiatives.
Social and environmental justice: Many contributors to this book accept that environmental struggles are intimately tied to workers’ and women's aspirations: struggles against climate change is tied to social justice. There is a strategic role for industrial workers in realizing this transformation, potentially unifying the entire working-class and its social allies, including women's and peasant-based struggles against dispossession and environmental destruction. Underlying this is the ideal that an alternative, socialist society must be characterized by the material equality of all its members as the basis for free and equal participation in processes of production and reproduction, respectful of the environment.
By criticizing neoliberalism and by reflecting on the forms alternatives have taken and are taking, this book tries to ‘polarize development’. This direction is meant not just to criticize existing social polarizations, but also to recognize the seeds of material interdependence and class power existing within the present society. In different ways, workers, women and social movements all over the world are trying to oppose the exploitative and oppressive social relations of capitalist rule. As the crisis continues to unfold and deepen, it is increasingly imperative that any realistic alternatives to neoliberalism moves beyond the pole of ‘reform and reproduce’ toward a radical break with capitalism itself. None of the strategies and principles presented in this book, on their own, is assumed to be sufficient to realize such a break. Nevertheless, in important and transformative ways, they each may contribute to advancing in this direction. We see our book, Polarizing Development, as a contribution to the struggles of workers and social movements, who are the real forces that can polarize development and subordinate it to real social needs. •
Select Bibliography:
  • Arrighi, G. (2007) Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century. London: Verso.
  • Burbach, R., Fox, M. and Fuentes, F. (2013) Latin America's Turbulent Transitions: The Future of Twenty-First-Century Socialism. Winnipeg and New York: Fernwood and Zed Books.
  • Grugel, J. and Riggirozzi, P. (2012) ‘Post-neoliberalism in Latin America: rebuilding and reclaiming the state after crisis’, Development and Change, 43(1): 1–21.
  • Kahn, S. R. and Christiansen, J. (eds) (2011) Towards New Developmentalism: Market as Means Rather Than Master. New York and Oxon, CA: Routledge.
  • Marois, T. (2012) States, Banks, and Crisis: Emerging Finance Capitalism in Mexico and Turkey. Cheltenham, Glos.: Edward Elgar.
  • Marois, T. (2014) ‘Historical precedents, contemporary manifestations: crisis and the socialization of financial risk in neoliberal Mexico’, Review of Radical Political Economics, 46(3).
  • Patomäki, H. (2012) The Great Eurozone Disaster: From Crisis to Global New Deal. London: Zed Books.
  • Pradella, L. (2014) ‘New developmentalism and the origins of methodological nationalism’, Competition and Change, 18(2): 180–93.
  • Prashad, V. (2013) The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South. London: Verso.
  • Shaikh, A. (2004) ‘The economic mythology of neoliberalism’, pp. 41–49 in A. Saad-Filho (ed.),Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader. London: Pluto.

Wednesday, May 20, 2015

Is Harper the worst prime minister in history? By Bruce Livesey in News | May 18th 2015

Excellent article by Bruce Livesey, National Post 18 May 2015.


Assessing Stephen Harper #1 of 1 articles
Illustration by Victor Juhasz for National Observer
“I think Harper… can be vindictive, certainly not always grateful for what people have done for him in the past… So you can say he’s ruthless, which is probably true… Maybe that’s a personal failing.” 

– Tom Flanagan, former Harper adviser, campaign manager and University of Calgary political scientist
Five weeks after Stephen Harper won his majority government in 2011, Maclean’s magazine ran a story asking experts to name Canada’s best prime ministers. Harper ranked 11th on the list.

Stephen Azzi, a Carleton University historian who co-authored the Maclean’s piece, says he doubts very much Harper would have budged on the list if their survey were conducted today. “All of the prime ministers we consider successful have some major accomplishment they can point to – Harper doesn’t have that,” he explains. “His accomplishment first of all is winning power and staying in power and then there are a series of minor things that his supporters like. But it will be hard for future generations to remember him for these things.”
On the Maclean’s list, the prime ministers below Harper were either in power very briefly – such as Kim Campbell, John Turner and Joe Clark – or were otherwise forgettable, such as R.B. Bennett and Arthur Meighen. For historians, to be considered an important prime minister, you must leave behind a significant government program or legislative milestone – such as Lester B. Pearson when he created Medicare and the Canada Pension Plan, or Brian Mulroney with free trade and the acid rain treaty.
“When I think of the Harper government, what would be a lasting implication?” asks Dimitry Anastakis, a historian at Trent University. “There are a lot of takeaways the government has done in terms of diminishing the capacity of government. I suppose that is the legacy. I don’t think it’s a positive legacy — I think it is a very negative legacy.”
Even conservatives can’t point to major achievements. Tom Flanagan says with the exception of some criminal justice reforms, Harper has not delivered on social conservative issues, such as abortion or gay marriage, and didn’t end things like corporate subsidies. Flanagan does point to lowering the tax burden on Canadians as Harper’s biggest accomplishment – in particular the childcare benefit and tax cuts to parents with children. “I felt [the previous tax system] was unfair to parents raising a family,” he says.
On the childcare front, Harper scrapped plans for a national daycare program that Paul Martin had promised. And the childcare benefit and tax cuts don’t come close to covering the cost of daycare for an average parent.
But is Harper the worst prime minister in Canadian history?
Investigative journalist Michael Harris, author of Party of One, the bestseller about Harper’s tenure, believes so. “There is something very Stalinesque about Harper,” remarks Harris. “My bottom line on this guy is, he hates democracy. He doesn’t care about truth and cares only about the perception of what benefits him. In that way he’s way worse [than his predecessors].”

Naturally, assessing Harper’s legacy depends on your own politics: conservatives will view him more kindly than liberals and leftists. Moreover, Harper does not rule in the same environment as prime ministers of the past. “I say to people who say this is the worst ever – really? Ask any visible minority, aboriginal or woman how the government treated them before 1975,” says Duff Conacher, founder of Democracy Watch, an Ottawa-based civil liberties organization.
Still, given his longevity in power, and in regards to the fundamental things people grade a government on – such as the economy, democratic practices, the environment, corruption, foreign policy, culture, civil liberties – Harper’s record might very well place him as the worst prime minister in Canadian history.

His democratic record

When Canadian Press reporter Dene Moore asked to interview Fisheries and Oceans Canada scientist Max Bothwell last year about a particular type of algae he studies, her request was denied. Out of curiosity, CP made an access to information request to find out why – and discovered that Moore’s simple request had generated 110 pages of emails between 16 different government communications staffers.
Why such agitation? The Environmental Law Association at the University of Victoria speculates that certain subjects are red-flagged within the government because they might be to issues important to the oil industry. And algae growth is linked to climate change.
If there is one area in which Harper is particularly vulnerable, it’s the charge that he runs one of the most undemocratic regimes in Canadian history – and has undermined and abused democratic institutions and procedures at every turn. In fact, he is the only Canadian prime minister to be found in contempt of Parliament, which occurred in 2011 after his government refused to release costs on certain programs to opposition MPs.
Photo of Prime Minister Stephen Harper by Danny Kresnyak
A more recent example is Bill C-51, the government’s anti-terrorism legislation, which critics say will criminalize free speech and allow government agencies to widely share personal information without any regard to privacy, while giving CSIS, RCMP and CSEC freer range to spy on whomever they choose. The law also allows these agencies to hold people up to a week in “preventative detention."

Last year, Democracy Watch released its annual report card on the government’s performance, giving it an “F” on accountability and democratic reform. “The secret unethical lobbying, excessive secrecy, conflict of interest, and donations scandals in 2013, and the broken promises… make it clear that another Accountability Act is needed to close dozens of loopholes and clean up the federal government,” Conacher said at the time.
After Harper became prime minister, he introduced the Federal Accountability Act (FAA). But Conacher says that only 29 of the act’s 60 promised reforms were put in place (seven were then rolled back). “The biggest thing they did, which was really bad, was to break 31 other promises,” he says.

Conacher notes that Harper did make some positive changes, such as creating the parliamentary budget office, improving oversight of lobbyists, lowering the amount that corporations can contribute to federal parties, extending the Access to Information Act to more government agencies, and making it harder for parliamentary staff to get public service jobs.

Yet these have been offset by a laundry list of undemocratic actions, which include:
  • Proroguing Parliament four times, shutting it down for a total of 181 days. In 2008, Harper prorogued Parliament after opposition parties threatened to bring down his minority government. He did it twice more in 2009 when Harper claimed he wanted to keep Parliament in recess during the Winter Olympics (while opposition members felt it was to avoid investigations into the Afghan detainee affair)— and the fourth time was in 2013 after the opposition said he was avoiding questions over the Senate spending scandal.
  • Omnibus bills. Starting in 2010, Harper tabled a bill with 883 pages that included changes to Canada Post and environmental assessments. Since then, Harper has passed 10 more omnibus bills to circumvent debate in parliament, often making sweeping changes to laws and regulations. “All have been an abuse of process and shown contempt for Parliament by subverting its role,” editorialized The Globe and Maillast fall. “Major changes to policy and law that should have been examined by MPs have been pushed through with almost no debate, sometimes with disastrous results.”
    One bill attempted to appoint Justice Marc Nadon to the Supreme Court, although he was not eligible. In 2012, one of the omnibus bills, C-38, completely gutted Canada’s environmental laws, cut $36-billion from health care funding, weakened Canada’s food inspectors through job cuts, and made it harder to qualify for EI benefits.
  • Robocalling during the 2011 election. Michael Harris, in his book Party of One, calls it “Canada’s worst election scandal.” Just prior to election day, some voters across Canada received recorded calls that either told them to go to the wrong polling station, or were of a harassing nature, purportedly made by opposition parties. The targeted voters didn't support the Conservatives. Investigations revealed the involvement of RackNine Inc., a political consulting firm the Conservatives hired, and Michael Sona, a low-level Conservative party staffer who was sentenced last year to nine months in prison for his role. Two judges found that it was likely other senior Tories were involved.
  • Fair Elections Act. Last year the Harper government overhauled Canada’s election laws to deal with electoral fraud. But its critics soon labeled it the “Unfair Elections Act” because it weakened the power of Elections Canada, effectively muzzling the chief electoral officer from communicating with the public and MPs about investigations, and cut off the agency’s investigations arm, while polling supervisors were now to be appointed by the incumbent party’s candidate or party. (Elections Canada used to appoint them.)
  • Gagging scientists from speaking freely about their research. Numerous scientists have been prevented from speaking to the media, especially those researching the environment. The government has also been accused of sending “minders” when some scientists have attended international conferences, along with speaking points, to ensure they stay on message.
    In 2013, the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (PIPSC), which represents 20,000 federal scientists, found that hundreds of their members said they had been asked to exclude or alter technical information in government documents for non-scientific reasons, and thousands said they had been prevented from responding to the media or the public.
  • Spying on environmental and aboriginal activists. Jeffrey Monaghan, a criminologist at Carleton University, has obtained documents from CSIS and RCMP through access to information laws that reveal how these agencies are spying on the environmental movement, especially those opposed to pipelines or who participate in National Energy Board (NEB) hearings.
    These groups include Idle No More, Leadnow, ForestEthics Advocacy, the Council of Canadians, the Dogwood Initiative, EcoSociety, and the Sierra Club of British Columbia. The documents show how information on various groups is shared among the intelligence agencies and the NEB. They also revealed that twice a year, at the CSIS headquarters in Ottawa, top-ranking members of the RCMP, CSIS and the CSEC meet with oil industry representatives to brief them on the “threat” from environmental and aboriginal groups.
Photo of Grand Chief Stewart Phillip and Tsleil-Waututh elder Amy George protesting the Kinder Morgan pipeline expansion by Mychaylo Prystupa
  • Auditing environmental and civil society groups. In the 2012 budget, the government announced it was going to earmark $8-million so that the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) could begin auditing selected charities. Seven environmental groups were soon targeted.
    This sum has since been increased to $13-million a year and expanded to anti-poverty, foreign aid and human rights groups, such as Amnesty International, as well as the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and United Church of Canada. Last fall, the Broadbent Institute issued a report that said these audits were politically motivated – because no conservative think tanks or groups had been targeted.
  • Taxpayer-funded political ads. This spring, Finance Canada is planning to spend $13.5-million on ads to boast about the government’s budget. The Toronto Starestimates that $500-million has been spent by the Harper government since 2009 promoting its programs – $75-million in 2014 alone. Finance spent $7.5-million on Economic Action Plan ads, Employment and Social Development spent $7-million on a skills initiative campaign, and the CRA spent $6-million on ads about new tax measures. Queen’s University political science professor Jonathan Rose told The Globe and Mailrecently: “What’s so egregious is the blatant way that they’re priming the electorate before an election.”
For many political observers, one of the most alarming changes Harper has ushered in is not even legislative: it’s the way in which political discourse is conducted. “They have a clear policy of dishonest spin on almost everything,” says Conacher. “They’ve done that far more than any other government in the last 25 years, which is to lie and stick to the lie.”
A recent example happened last week when the Prime Minister’s Office posted two videos online of Harper visiting special forces soldiers in Iraq, in violation of security protocols. When this was raised, the PMO first claimed the protocols had not been breached, and then claimed defence officials had vetted them, before they issued an evasive apology.
Michael Harris agrees with Conacher, saying “(Harper) is a person who does not believe in the truth… For the prime minister of a country where he’s setting the entire agenda and putting the signature across a whole government and where words don’t mean much, we are in a lot of trouble… He is the first prime minister who is a marketer, an aluminum siding salesman. He is not a truth teller.”

His economic record

This past March, in an article headlined “Why Canada’s economy is headed off the cliff,” Yale University economics lecturer Vikram Mansharamani argued that Canada is among the most vulnerable large economies in the world. With a high level of consumer debt ($1.82-trillion) that now exceeds GDP ($1.6-trillion), combined with rising housing prices and dropping oil prices, he concluded: “It seems our Crazy Canadian Coyote has run off the cliff.”
Stephen Harper has based much of his credibility on being a capable steward of the economy – supposedly the strongest in the G7 – and will likely be using this as a plank in his re-election campaign.
But what’s the real story?
“Five years of recovery and this economy is the weakest we’ve ever seen,” says Armine Yalnizyan, senior economist at the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. “I think the majority of Canadians are worse off than they were in 2006 – they have not seen wage gains keep up with cost increases. And I think most people who have children are worried about their kids’ future.”
Tonya Richardson, 45, would agree. A vivacious single mother of a 10-year-old boy who lives in Toronto, Richardson lost her job as a job recruitment consultant this past February. Richardson says until 2008 she was earning up to $60,000 a year, but then lost about $15,000 of her income after the economy tanked and commissions declined. Now she’s receiving a total of $2,000 a month on EI. “It’s a tough (job) market out there,” she says. “It’s a really frustrating time – no one is getting call backs. Not having child support, and it’s getting to month three [without work], the stress levels are high.”
When he was elected in 2006, Harper inherited a booming economy. With commodity prices surging, the economy was growing at three per cent per year, with an unemployment rate of 6.6 per cent. The government was running a surplus of more than $13-billion, and net debt was $492-billion (and falling).
Fast forward to now and the unemployment rate is 6.8 per cent and climbing, with job growth anemic: only 121,000 jobs were created last year (three-quarters of which were temporary), which did not keep pace with population growth of 308,000. The commodities boom has cooled, in particular with oil prices plunging.
Harper has run deficits since 2008, and the federal debt is now $615-billion and rising.
But that’s not the alarming thing. In the five years prior to 2006, Canada’s manufacturing industries lost 200,000 jobs. After Harper was elected, another 400,000 manufacturing jobs vanished, with manufacturing as a share of the economy dropping from 16 per cent in 2004 down to 12 per cent last year. The high-tech manufacturing sector is in terrible shape, having shrunk to 1.3 per cent of GDP, making it one of the smallest in the developed world.
The loss of manufacturing is germane to how Canada’s economy is changing – and not for the better. In 2000, Canada had a well-rounded economy, with value-added products accounting for over 60 per cent of exports. But according to Jim Stanford, chief economist of the Unifor trade union, free trade and a strong dollar decimated Canada’s manufacturing base. Thus, notes Stanford, by 2010 value-added products had fallen by one-third, and “unprocessed or barely-processed resource products once again accounted for the lion’s share of total exports.” In other words, Canada was returning to becoming a country of “hewers of wood and drawers of water” – digging up oil and minerals for other countries to turn into products.
Oil sands first quarter results
Oil sands aerial photo by Andrew S. Wright
Harper, as it turns out, was the worst person to become prime minister given these circumstances. As a follower of the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek, Harper’s approach is not to interfere in the economy, except for cutting taxes. Thus, he deducted two points from the GST, and slashed corporate taxes from 22 per cent down to 15 per cent, and cut personal taxes.
But this made the government ill-equipped for the 2008-’09 recession: one estimate says tax cuts cost the treasury roughly $34-billion per year. Surpluses quickly vanished just when he needed to prime the economic pump. And as the recession deepened, he was forced to borrow money – thereby generating greater debt – to prevent a more severe downturn.
As manufacturing declined, Harper did not step in to rescue this sector. Instead, he placed his bets on the growing resource extraction industries, in particular oil.
Did this make the Canadian economy stronger or weaker?
By focusing on commodities, Canada was susceptible to a bust in commodity prices – in particular when oil prices tumbled last year. So, as the American economy is now taking off, the Canadian economy is sinking. “We entered the [2008-09 economic] crisis with the eighth-largest economy in the world,” says Yalnizyan. “We are now ranking 11th and sliding down that greasy pole as other countries move it up as they capture production – because they have lower costs and equally high investment in skills.”
“We have slipped towards the status we held in the global economy about 100 years ago,” she continues, “but that is not actually enough to stay in the top tier of nations.”
Moreover, Yalnizyan says Harper has not developed an alternative renewable energy sector, the way China is doing. “We are not investing in that – instead we are subsidizing extraction and fighting over pipelines… We should be at front end of that [renewables] parade and we are not doing it.”
How has the average Canadian household fared under Harper? People like Tonya Richardson are falling out of the middle class: she pays almost $1,300 a month in rent, leaving her only $700 to cover food for her and her boy and other living expenses. “I have been living hand to mouth to raise my son,” she says.
In fact, under Harper, median income (after taxes) rose for the first two years after he was elected, and then plateaued (2011 is the last year statistics are available). EKOS Research surveys show that since the start of the 2000s, Canadians identifying themselves as middle class have declined from 70 per cent to about 60 per cent of adults. In a 2014 survey by Yconic, a Canadian company that conducts research panels with millennials, 43 per cent of those between 30 and 33 said they were still relying on financial help from family.
Meanwhile, the level of consumer debt has shot up from just under $1-trillion in 2006 to $1.82-trillion today, which means that for every $100 in disposable income, Canadian households owe $163 in debt (some economists say this is offset by the growth in Canadians’ net value in savings and assets and is not overly alarming).
While the middle class struggles, the rich have grown richer. According to figures derived from Canadian Business magazine, by 2012 the 86 wealthiest Canadian-resident individuals (and families) held the same amount of wealth as the poorest 11.4 million Canadians combined — or almost one-third of the population. The average wage in Canada increased by six per cent between 1998 and 2012 while the average compensation of Canada’s highest paid 100 CEOs increased by 73 per cent during that same period.
Moreover, Harper’s corporate tax cuts did nothing to strengthen private sector investment, which has been falling since 2010, while corporate cash or “dead money” has been climbing.
Stanford sums up Harper’s legacy this way: “Our R&D performance is among the worst of any industrialized country. So is our productivity growth. This is where the Harper vision is really vulnerable. They talk about free markets and business efficiency but the average productivity growth since Harper has come on is 0.5 per cent per year, and that would be the weakest productivity growth in postwar history… I would conclude quite strongly that Canada’s economic performance on a range of measures – job creation, income productivity, business investment, trade performance and even fiscal affairs – has been the worst of any government [since the Second World War].”

His environmental record

Back in 2002, when Harper was leader of the Canadian Alliance, he sent a letter to supporters saying “We’re gearing up for the biggest struggle our party has faced since you entrusted me with the leadership. I’m talking about the ‘Battle of Kyoto’ — our campaign to block the job-killing, economy-destroying Kyoto Accord.” Soon after he won his majority in 2011, Harper pulled Canada out of Kyoto, the first signatory to do so.
Photo of Prime Minister Stephen Harper at the Vancouver Board of Trade and climate protesters by David P. Ball
Despite that 13 of the hottest years on record have occurred since 2000 (and 2014 was the very hottest) Harper has fought every effort to impose climate change measures.
Thus, Germanwatch and Climate Action Network Europe — which produce an annual report card on climate change performance — put Canada 58th out of 61 countries in regards to its efforts to combat global warming, above only Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan and Australia. In 2013, these organizations said Canada “shows no intention of moving forward with climate policy and therefore remains the worst performer of all industrialized countries.” Last fall, the liberal American magazine The New Republic called Harper and his Australian counterpart Tony Abbot “earth’s worst climate villains.”
During Harper’s tenure, emissions of greenhouse gases peaked in 2007 at 761 megatonnes, then fell during the recession, but has been steadily rising again, although still below 2007 levels. According to Environment Canada, while Canada accounted for 2.1 per cent of global CO2 emissions in 2005, it fell to 1.8 per cent in 2010 and is expected to fall to 1.6 per cent by 2020.
So why is Canada being cast as an environmental villain?
It’s largely because Harper refuses to sign any binding agreement that would force Canada to meet climate change targets and significantly cut greenhouse emissions. Last December, Environment Canada said that by 2020, Canada would be producing 727 megatonnes of CO2, which is far higher than the 611 megatonnes Harper targeted at the Copenhagen climate change summit in 2009. The report said that emissions from the oil and gas sector would grow by 45 megatonnes between 2005 and 2020, nearly offsetting the 50 megatonne reduction expected in the electricity sector.
The reasons for Harper’s inaction are no surprise. For one, it’s long been suspected he doesn’t believe climate change poses a threat. But then there’s a purely political calculation: his party enjoys broad support in Alberta, and his economic agenda has been focused on developing the oil sands. “If you look at Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions, Alberta emits more gas than Ontario and Quebec combined [although] 60 per cent of Canadians live in Ontario and Quebec,” says Erin Flanagan, an oil sands analyst with the Pembina Institute, an energy think tank.
The Harper government has also fought to get Keystone XL built, along with other pipelines accessing the tar sands. Because pipelines reduce the cost of transporting bitumen, they make the tar sands more viable for the oil industry, but also make it more likely that up to 240 billion metric tons of carbon could be released into the atmosphere.
In 2012, the government launched an unprecedented assault on Canada’s environmental laws when it introduced Bill C-38, mentioned above – an omnibus bill that put a halt to automatic environmental assessments of projects under the federal government’s purview.
All told, the Fisheries Act, Navigable Waters Protection Act and Canadian Environmental Assessment Act were either repealed or simply gutted, while the NEB was neutered.
“So you can go through all the legislation that was changed… there’s a direct link to the long-standing requests of the oil industry to remove these environmental barriers to rapid resource development,” says Tim Gray, executive director of Environmental Defence, a Toronto-based environmental group.
Indeed, the consequences were summed up by Green Party Leader Elizabeth May, who noted: “In Bill C-38, Stephen Harper canceled and gutted environmental laws brought in by Brian Mulroney. He’s now moved on to destroy environmental laws brought in by Sir John A. MacDonald.”
Overall, Harper’s environmental record has isolated Canada on the world stage. Last September, he refused to fly to a UN-sponsored climate change summit in New York attended by 120 world leaders, sending his environment minister instead.
Thus, it’s not surprising some observers see Harper hastening the demise of Canada as an admired nation state. When Christian Nadeau, a political philosopher at the Université de Montréal, is asked how Canada has fared under Harper, he replies:
“Overall, it’s worse off. Definitely worse off. We have a weaker democracy. We have a weaker social justice system. We have compromised the environment for many decades to come. So, Harper's is one of the worst governments we've ever had.”
Part two coming soon